We generalize the CAPM to a setting where a regulator requires …rms to report earnings before their shares are publicly traded but does not specify the reporting system that maps economic income into reported earnings. We show that under fairly mild conditions, a riskaverse entrepreneur (as representative of the initial owners of the …rm) will endogenously choose a reporting system where reported earnings re ‡ect economic income to a greater extent in bad states than in good states. The intuition for this result is that by virtue of being risk averse, the entrepreneur's utility is concave; as such, he derives greater marginal bene…t from reducing uncertainty in bad states. Thus, the entrepreneur will be more willing to undertake costly veri…cation in bad states, and this di¤erential level of veri…cation results in reported earnings that re ‡ect economic income to a greater extent in bad states. Additionally, we show that the choice of reporting system endogenously a¤ects …rms'systematic risk. Firms where reported earnings re ‡ect economic income to a greater extent in bad states have higher (lower) covariance with the market portfolio in good (bad) states. Strikingly, these results obtain even in the most basic of circumstances, where earnings serve only a valuation role and there are no agency problems or contracting considerations.
Introduction
A large literature examines the relation between properties of the …nancial reporting system and various capital market outcomes. Many of the studies in this literature either explicitly or implicitly take the properties of the reporting system as given. In this paper, we take a di¤erent approach. Rather than focus solely on the capital market consequences of …nancial reporting, we attempt to understand the fundamental economic forces that determine the properties of the reporting system and, in turn, the e¤ect of these forces on capital markets.
One of the most studied-and controversial-properties of …nancial reporting is the asymmetry in the extent to which reported earnings re ‡ect contemporaneous economic income (e.g., Ball, Kothari, and Nikolaev, 2013) . A wide variety of accounting rules require the recognition of expected losses but only allow the recognition of realized gains. For example, when the value of property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) declines, earnings re ‡ect the decline in value, but when the value of PP&E increases, earnings do not re ‡ect the increase in value. Existing economic theory suggests that the asymmetry in reported earnings is exclusively the result of economic forces related to the stewardship role of earnings: the role of earnings in mitigating agency problems and facilitating e¢ cient contracting (see Armstrong, Guay, and Weber, 2011, and Kothari, Ramanna, and Skinner, 2011, for reviews) . 1 Many studies argue that if it were not for the stewardship role of accounting, reported earnings would symmetrically re ‡ect economic income (e.g., Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Guay and Verrecchia, 2006; Ball et al., 2008) .
In this paper, we examine whether there are additional economic forces beyond agency and contracting that could give rise to the asymmetry in reported earnings, and, in turn, whether this asymmetry is valuable even in the absence of agency con ‡icts. We develop a parsimonious model to study the endogenous choice of reporting system and whether that system entails asymmetric treatment of economic income. We extend the classic Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to a setting where a regulator requires each …rm to report earnings prior to selling shares to investors. This setting corresponds to the requirement that …rms must …le …nancial statements with the SEC prior to being publicly traded. Although the regulator requires each …rm to report earnings, the regulator does not specify the reporting system that maps economic income into reported earnings. Instead, a …rm's initial owners (i.e., the entrepreneur) choose the reporting system conditional on their expectation of economic income. We refer to the …rm as being in a "good state" if expected income is high and in a "bad state"if expected income is low. The entrepreneur's choice of reporting system is represented by the extent to which reported earnings re ‡ect contemporaneous economic income (i.e., reporting precision), and we assume that more precise reporting requires greater veri…cation, which comes at an increasing cost to the entrepreneur.
In modeling the entrepreneur's choice of reporting precision, we deliberately abstract away from agency con ‡icts and contracting considerations. This ensures that our results are solely attributable to the valuation role of earnings rather than a stewardship role.
In our model, the sole purpose of reported earnings is to facilitate valuation by investors.
Nevertheless, and contrary to conventional wisdom, we show that under very mild conditions, reported earnings re ‡ect contemporaneous economic income to a greater extent in the bad state: a property that we refer to as "asymmetric reporting in favor of bad news." This property comports with the notion of asymmetric timeliness in the empirical literaturethat reported earnings re ‡ect contemporaneous bad news to a greater extent than good news.
We establish a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the optimal reporting system to be asymmetric in favor of bad news. We characterize the condition in terms of four exogenous parameters: (i) the entrepreneur's risk aversion; (ii) the …rm's systematic risk; (iii) the volatility of economic income; and (iv) the minimum level of reporting precision required by the regulator. We solve for the optimal reporting precisions in both states when this condition is met, and show that the magnitude of the asymmetry is decreasing in the expected economic income in the bad state and increasing in expected economic income in the good state. The intuition for these results is that because the entrepreneur is risk-averse, he derives greater bene…t from a reduction in uncertainty in the bad state. As a consequence, the entrepreneur will be more willing to undertake costly veri…cation in the bad state, and this di¤erential level of veri…cation results in reported earnings re ‡ecting economic income to a greater extent in the bad state. We also show that mandated (i.e., exogenous) changes in accounting standards that increase the minimum level of reporting precision in both states reduce the asymmetry in reported earnings, which in turn reduces welfare. The intuition for this result is that the veri…cation costs associated with reporting more precisely accrue in both states, whereas the bene…ts accrue primarily in the bad state.
Finally, we show that when reported earnings are asymmetric in favor of bad news, the …rm's systematic risk is also asymmetric: investors'assessment of the …rm's covariance with the market portfolio is lower in bad states than in good states. The intuition for this result is that reporting is more precise in the bad state, and, in the CAPM, more precise reporting reduces investors' assessments of the …rm's systematic risk (e.g., Lambert et al. 2007 ).
Consequently, the …rm's systematic risk is lower (higher) in the bad (good) state. To the best of our knowledge this prediction is unique to our model. Prior literature on the role of asymmetric reporting in reducing agency con ‡icts suggests asymmetric reporting a¤ects the mean of the …rm's cash ‡ow; as such, it has exclusively an indirect e¤ect on the …rm's cost of capital. In our analysis, asymmetric reporting has an additional direct e¤ect that operates through investors' assessment of the …rm's covariance with the market portfolio.
Empirical researchers can use this insight to distinguish among the various explanations for why reported earnings asymmetrically re ‡ect economic income. For example, if the asymmetry is solely attributable to the stewardship role of earnings, then we would not expect any asymmetry in systematic risk.
Two key features of our model distinguish it from prior research. First, our model generalizes the reporting space to allow the entrepreneur's choice of reporting precision to vary with the expectation of economic income. Prior work that focuses on state contingent reporting examines how expected economic income a¤ects voluntary disclosure when managers have private information (e.g., Bagnoli and Watts, 2007) . In contrast, we focus on how expected economic income a¤ects the information conveyed by mandatory disclosure (e.g., earnings)
in the absence of private information. In particular, we characterize the conditions under which reported earnings re ‡ect economic income to a greater extent in the bad state. In this regard, our model links expected income with reporting precision, and in turn the …rm's systematic risk.
Second, we focus exclusively on the valuation role of earnings. Our focus on the valuation role of earnings is not intended to suggest that stewardship considerations play no role in the asymmetry in reported earnings, but rather that such considerations are not necessary to generate asymmetry. Perhaps the most striking aspect of our analysis is the simplicity of the model that is needed to generate our results. For example, our chief requirements are that the entrepreneur is risk averse and veri…cation is costly. These requirements seem descriptive of a broad range of circumstances, suggesting that a reporting system that entails asymmetric treatment of bad news is optimal in a wide variety of settings, even in the absence of agency and contracting considerations. Our analysis suggests that the valuation role of earnings is an important driving force behind the asymmetry in reported earnings that has heretofore been overlooked.
By focusing on the valuation role of earnings, we contribute to the relatively small litera-ture on the endogenous choice of reporting precision in the absence of agency and contracting motivations (e.g., Titman and Trueman, 1986; Stocken and Verrecchia, 2004; see Stocken, 2012 for a review). In Titman and Trueman (1986) , the entrepreneur observes economic income with noise, and chooses a more (less) precise reporting system when his private information suggests that such income is high (low). In Stocken and Verrecchia (2004) a manager has private information that is not conveyed by the reporting system and chooses a less (more) precise reporting system when he has more (less) precise private information. Our model is very di¤erent from these studies in that it represents a generalization of the CAPM where the entrepreneur commits to a reporting system in advance of observing economic income. In our model, the entrepreneur does not have private information, and thus there is no information asymmetry between the entrepreneur and investors. This parsimonious setup makes transparent both the condition under which asymmetric reporting is optimal, as well as the e¤ect of asymmetric reporting on asset prices. It also illustrates the generality of our results, insofar as information asymmetry, agency con ‡icts, and contracting considerations are likely to reinforce the bene…t of asymmetric reporting.
Our paper makes two main contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the literature on the endogenous design of …nancial reporting systems. While much of the empirical literature takes the properties of observed reporting systems as given and examines their e¤ects on capital markets and contracts, it is important to understand the forces that shape the properties of reporting systems. Empirical analyses along these lines are inherently di¢ cult because historical data are conditional on observed markets, institutions, and political processes (both past and present). Accordingly, the limited research that exists on optimal reporting systems is theoretical in nature and focuses almost exclusively on agency con ‡icts (e.g., Chen et al., 2007; Goex and Wagenhofer, 2009; Caskey and Laux, 2013 Second, we contribute to the literature on the relation between …nancial reporting and the cost of capital. Existing theoretical work in this literature takes reporting precision as given and examines whether and how it a¤ects a …rm's cost of capital (e.g., Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert, et al., 2007) . One important limitation of this work is that it ignores the choice of reporting precision. For example, these analyses suggest that absent some (unspeci…ed) cost, …rms will gravitate to the corner solution of reporting with the highest precision possible. We extend this literature by modeling a risk-averse entrepreneur's endogenous choice of reporting precision, derive the conditions under which asymmetric reporting emerges as the optimum, and show that it is priced in the sense that it a¤ects …rms' cost of capital. In particular, we show that when reported earnings more precisely re ‡ect economic income (e.g., in bad states), …rms have lower systematic risk and therefore lower cost of capital. In other words, we show that an important consequence of asymmetric reporting precision is that a …rm's Beta-and therefore its risk-premium-di¤ers across states. Thus, our model can be viewed as a Conditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (or Conditional CAPM) in which …rms'Betas are endogenously in ‡uenced both by properties of the reporting system as well as the state.
In this regard, our paper answers Cochrane's (2013) call to endogenize investors'assessments and earnings manipulation. While some studies examine limited liability explanations, these models are also premised on the existence of agency con ‡icts (e.g., Kwon et al., 2001 ).
of systematic risk rather than simply treat systematic risk as an exogenous parameter.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents and solves the model and derives the necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which asymmetric reporting in favor of bad news is optimal. Section 3 discusses the comparative statics. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
Analysis

Setting
In this section we characterize the reporting environment in our model. In particular, we extend the CAPM to a setting where a regulator requires …rms to publicly report earnings before trade occurs, and the entrepreneur, as representative of the initial owners of the …rm, commits to a reporting system that maps economic income into reported earnings. The entrepreneur's choice of reporting system is represented by his choice of reporting precision, which determines the extent to which reported earnings re ‡ect economic income. We assume that, although the entrepreneur does not observe realized economic income at the time he chooses reporting precision, he can condition his choice of reporting precision on expected economic income. Figure 1 summarizes the timeline of our model. In period t = 0, in anticipation of having to report earnings, the entrepreneur commits to a reporting system that maps economic income into reported earnings. In period t = 1, investors observe reported earnings and subsequently trade shares of J …rms and a risk-free asset. In period t = 2, economic income is realized and paid to investors in the form of a liquidating dividend (the …rm's terminal cash ‡ow).
To facilitate the discussion, henceforth we use a tilde, i.e.,~, to denote a random variable.
Formally, the reported earnings of …rm j are characterized as
wherer j is reported earnings,Ṽ j is economic income, and~ j is noise in reported earnings.
We assume thatṼ j is correlated across …rms and follows a multivariate normal distribution
, and precision v j , where precision is the reciprocal of variance, and we represent the economic income of the market byṼ M , whereṼ M = P J k=1Ṽ k . We assume that~ j follows a multivariate normal distribution with mean 0, variance V ar[~ j ], and precision j , and that~ j is independent ofṼ j .
A standard interpretation of j is that it represents the extent to which reported earnings re ‡ect economic income: larger values of j indicate that the …rm's reported earnings,r, are a "less noisy"-or, equivalently, a "more precise"-measure of its economic income, V . As is standard in the literature, the entrepreneur's choice of the reporting system is operationalized by the choice of reporting precision, j . We assume that the regulator sets a non-zero minimum level of j (referred to as ? ). The role of this assumption is fairly benign: it ensures that reported earnings contain at least some information, and rules out the corner solution that earnings are pure noise (i.e., j = 0).
We allow for state-contingent reporting by assuming that although the entrepreneur does not know the …rm's realized economic income at the time he commits to a reporting system (i.e., j ), he can condition the choice of the reporting system on expected earnings, E hṼ i .
We refer to the …rm as being in a good state if E hṼ i = G and a bad state if E
where G > B . If the entrepreneur's chosen reporting precision is the same in both the good and bad states, then reported earnings re ‡ect economic income to the same extent in both states, and reporting is said to be symmetric. If the entrepreneur's chosen reporting precision is greater in the good state, then reported earnings re ‡ect economic income to a greater extent in the good state, and reporting is said to be asymmetric in favor of good news. Lastly, if the entrepreneur's chosen reporting precision is greater in the bad state, then reported earnings re ‡ect economic income to a greater extent in the bad state, and reporting is said to be asymmetric in favor of bad news. Note that our notion of "state" is …rm-speci…c: …rm j could be in a good state while …rm k is in a bad state. We focus the discussion and analysis on a two state world (i.e. good state or bad state) for parsimony and to develop the intuition for our results. In subsequent analysis we discuss how our results extend to a continuum of states.
Finally, we make two key assumptions regarding the entrepreneur and his objective function. First, for the entrepreneur's choice of reporting system to be meaningful, reporting must be costly. Accordingly, we assume that more precise reporting (i.e., increasing in the extent to which reported earnings re ‡ect economic income) entails an explicit cost to the entrepreneur of Second, we assume the entrepreneur is risk-averse (i.e., has concave utility). Speci…cally, we assume that the entrepreneur has a negative exponential utility function represented by
, where
and > 0 represents the entrepreneur's constant, absolute risk aversion. The entrepreneur chooses j at time t = 0 to maximize his expected utility, subject to the fact that j entails a cost of
Let P j (r j ) represent the price of …rm j as a function of reported earningsr j . We represent the entrepreneur's (of …rm j) objective function as:
Note that in eqn. (1), the price of the …rm, P j (r j ), is uncertain (random) because the entrepreneur does know in advance the realization of reported earnings when he commits to a reporting system. In other words, the entrepreneur chooses the extent to which reported earnings re ‡ect economic income through his choice of j , but he has no in ‡uence over the realization ofr; as a consequence, he has no in ‡uence over the realization of P j (r j ).
CAPM Pricing in the Absence of Reporting
Our next step is to discuss the derivation of asset prices and risk premia in the absence of reporting. These results serve as a useful benchmark with which to compare our subsequent results regarding endogenous reporting. In the absence of reporting, the entrepreneur and the reporting system play no role in the model, and N identically informed investors simply trade shares of J …rms and a risk-free asset in period t = 1. In the absence of reporting, the setting corresponds identically to that of the CAPM, and prices are set accordingly. For N identically informed investors each with constant absolute risk tolerance prices are given by
where: P j is the price of …rm j in period t = 1, N represents the economy's total risk tolerance; Cov
represents the covariance of the …rm's terminal cash ‡ow with that of the market portfolio; and R f is the risk-free rate. The derivation of eqn. (2) is provided in Appendix A and mirrors that in Lambert et al. (2007) . 3 The proof to all other results or claims in the paper can be found in Appendix B. As is standard in the literature, eqn. (2) makes clear that the …rm is priced based on its expected terminal cash ‡ow less a discount for systematic risk (i.e.,
CAPM Pricing in the Presence of Endogenous Reporting
We now derive asset prices and risk premia in the context of the (endogenous) reporting environment described above. The entrepreneur's objective is to maximize his expected utility at time t = 1 (when investors convene to trade shares) as a function of the price of …rm j conditional on reported earnings, where the entrepreneur determines the extent to which reported earnings re ‡ect economic income through his choice of j . Let P j (r j ) represent the price of …rm j conditional on the realization of reported earnings (i.e., conditional oñ r j = r j ). Using standard results from Bayesian statistics in conjunction with eqn. (2), conditional on reported earnings r j , prices are given by
Note that prices in the presence of reporting (eqn. (3)) are similar to those in the absence of reporting (eqn. (2)), with two important di¤erences. As before, the …rm is priced based on its expected economic income less a discount for systematic risk, except that investors'assessments of the …rm's expected economic income and systematic risk are now conditional on reported earnings. This implies that investors'assessments are conditional on the reporting system that generated reported earnings.
There are two extra terms in the numerator. The …rst, E
represents investors assessment of the …rm's economic income conditional on reported earncharacterization one employs is simply a matter of convenience.
ings. The second, , and intrinsic systematic risk embodied by
It is important to emphasize the distinction between the intrinsic systematic risk of the …rm and investors'assessment of the systematic risk conditional on observing reported
earnings. In our model, intrinsic systematic risk is exogenous and represents the primitive correlation between terminal cash ‡ows, whereas investors'assessment of systematic risk is endogenous and depends on the entrepreneur's (endogenous) choice of reporting precision, . Thus, by endogenizing the choice of reporting precision, we e¤ectively endogenize the …rm's systematic risk (as it manifests in prices). To the best of our knowledge this is the …rst model to endogenize both reporting precision and the …rm's systematic risk in the context of the CAPM. We solve for the entrepreneur's optimal choice of reporting precision in the next section.
Optimal precision choice
As is standard in any optimization problem, in choosing an optimal level of reporting precision, j , the entrepreneur trades o¤ the marginal bene…t of an increase in reporting precision against the marginal cost. In our model, there are two costs and one bene…t.
The …rst cost involves the explicit cost to the entrepreneur of reporting earnings with precision j : we interpret this cost as the cost of e¤ort. This cost operates through The second cost is more subtle and operates through E [U (P j (r j ))]. More precise reporting creates an additional risk for the entrepreneur, and because the entrepreneur is risk averse, an increase in risk decreases his expected utility. To explain this e¤ect, consider the extreme case where the entrepreneur reports nothing to investors (this violates the lower bound of ? , but we abstract from this for a moment). In this circumstance, investors assess the …rm's economic income to be E hṼ j i . Alternatively, suppose that the entrepreneur reports r j . In this circumstance, investors assess the …rm's economic income to be
, where the latter could be higher or lower than E hṼ j i depending upon whether the realization of reported earnings, r j , is greater or less than E
Thus, from the entrepreneur's perspective, reporting earnings is tantamount to participating in a lottery (r j is unknown at the time the entrepreneur chooses reporting precision), and because the entrepreneur is risk averse, he abhors lotteries: the entrepreneur prefers the "sure thing"of E hṼ j i . The marginal e¤ect of an increase in the "lottery"as a consequence of an increase in j is not as straightforward to characterize mathematically as the prior cost because it involves the computation of E [U (P j (r j ))], and we defer that computation to the Appendix; nonetheless, it represents a cost that is separate and apart from the cost of e¤ort (i.e., separate from
The bene…t is that as the entrepreneur commits to report more precisely, he reduces investors'assessment of the …rm's systematic risk: in e¤ect, an increase in reporting precision
For example, the marginal e¤ect of an increase in
. A standard interpretation of this bene…t is that it represents a reduction in "information risk"; as such, it provides a favorable boost to the price of …rm j.
To summarize, in choosing an optimal level of reporting precision the entrepreneur trades o¤ the marginal bene…t of reducing investors'assessments of the …rm's systematic risk against the marginal costs of exerting e¤ort and participating in a lottery. Henceforth we refer to the marginal bene…t of reducing investors'assessments of the …rm's systematic risk net of the marginal cost of participating in a lottery (both of which operates through E [U (P j (r j ))]) as the net marginal bene…t of an increase in j . When the net marginal bene…t is negative, it does not justify incurring the cost of e¤ort, and the entrepreneur will choose the lowest level of reporting precision allowed by the regulator, ? . When the net marginal bene…t is positive, the entrepreneur will choose a j such that the net marginal bene…t that operates through
] equals the marginal cost of e¤ort that operates through Lemma. One can characterize the entrepreneur's optimal choice of precision,
This characterization presumes that the optimization problem is well behaved insofar as it yields a well-de…ned solution: we discuss this issue in the Appendix in conjunction with proving this result.
Reporting precision in good versus bad states
At time t = 0 before the entrepreneur of …rm j chooses reporting precision, he comes to know the state of the …rm (i.e., E
Here there are two possible assumptions one could make about investors. The …rst assumption is that at time t = 0 investors are also aware of the state: in e¤ect, the state of …rm j is common knowledge.
4 In words, the expression This removes any information asymmetry between the entrepreneur and investors. The second assumption is that at time t = 0 investors do not know the state, but because investors have rational expectations, they can make an inference about the state based on the entrepreneur's actions or choices when he provides his report. As it relates to the analysis below, both assumptions yield qualitatively similar results. Thus, we start out assuming that at time t = 0 investors also know whether E hṼ j i equals G or B , and then later discuss any change in our results as a consequence of assuming that investors do not know the state of the …rm. In the Appendix we prove the following result.
Proposition. The entrepreneur's (unique) choice of reporting precision in the bad state is never less than the choice in the good state, and typically higher when the …rm's intrinsic systematic risk is greater than one-half the entrepreneur's risk aversion times the variance of the …rm's economic income:
Note our deliberate use of the word "typically"in the statement of the Proposition, as well as other results that we report below. When eqn. (4) holds, the entrepreneur's preferred choice of reporting precision is higher in the bad state, and reported earnings re ‡ect economic income to a greater extent in the bad state (as compared to the good state). These preferred choices, however, are subject to the requirement that they exceed the regulatory lower bound of ? . When the choice of reporting precision in the bad state does not exceed ? , then the entrepreneur is forced to choose ? in both the good and bad states (because the bad state choice is always higher than the good state choice). Thus, "typically" relates to the requirement that the choice of j in the bad state exceeds the regulatory lower bound of ? .
The intuition underlying the Proposition is that when the inequality in eqn. (4) does not hold, the net marginal bene…t of an increase in j on E [U (P j (r j ))] is non-positive.
Consequently, and irrespective of whether …rm j is in the good or bad state, the entrepreneur chooses the lowest level of precision allowed, ? . Because the level of precision is identical in both states, the choice of reporting precision in the bad state is no lower than the choice in the good state.
Alternatively, when the inequality in eqn. (4) holds, the net marginal bene…t of an increase in j on E [U (P j (r j ))] is positive. In the good state, however, the net marginal bene…t of an increase in j is lower than in the bad state. The reason why it is lower is that by virtue of being risk averse, the entrepreneur's utility is concave; concavity implies that the marginal bene…t of an increase in price in the good state is less than a commensurate increase in price in the bad state. An alternative way to state this intuition is that concavity implies that the entrepreneur becomes increasingly more sated as outcomes become increasingly better: satiation implies that the entrepreneur derives less marginal utility from an increase in price (and hence less marginal utility from a reduction in uncertainty). Because the net marginal bene…t of an increase in j is lower in the good state than in the bad state, the optimal choice of reporting precision is higher in the bad state than in the good state (when eqn. (4) holds, and assuming that the former exceeds the regulatory lower bound ? ).
It is important to emphasize the role risk aversion plays in ensuring that the entrepreneur's choice of reporting precision is asymmetric in favor of bad news. Risk aversion implies the marginal bene…t of an increase in price (reduction in uncertainty) is greater in the bad state. If the entrepreneur were risk neutral, the marginal bene…t of an increase in price would be the same in both states and consequently reporting would be symmetric: the entrepreneur's choice of reporting precision would be the same in both states, and reporting precision would be higher than if the entrepreneur were risk averse. This emphasizes the two key assumptions of our model: a risk averse entrepreneur and costly reporting
Additional considerations
To explain why one achieves qualitatively similar results if investors do not know the state of …rm j at time t = 0, suppose this is the case. When the inequality in eqn. (4) holds, investors with rational expectations will conjecture the …rm's state based on the entrepreneur's choice of reporting precision, and in equilibrium this conjecture will hold. Thus, e¤ectively rational investors will always know (or can infer) the state.
When the inequality in eqn. (4) does not hold, let us assume that the ex ante probability of being in the good (bad) state is q (1 q). Note that this uncertainty is idiosyncratic to …rm j and therefore does not manifest in investors'assessments of the …rm's systematic risk. Here, investors will conjecture that E hṼ j i = q G + (1 q) B and this conjecture will also hold because when the inequality in eqn. (4) does not hold, the entrepreneur chooses the lowest level of reporting precision allowed (i.e., ? ) in both states. In short, when eqn. 
Comparative Statics
In this section we discuss three comparative statics. The …rst comparative static speaks to the asymmetry in the extent to which reported earnings re ‡ect economic income in the two states-speci…cally how the magnitude of the asymmetry is a¤ected by expected economic income. The second comparative static speaks to how properties of the …nancial reporting system endogenously determine …rms' systematic risk-speci…cally how the asymmetry in reported earnings endogenously a¤ects investors' assessment of the …rm's covariance with the market portfolio, i.e., "Beta.". The third comparative static speaks to the role of the regulator-speci…cally the welfare implications of altering the minimum level of reporting precision required by the regulator.
Magnitude of Reporting Asymmetry
In the Appendix, we prove the following as a corollary to the Proposition.
Corollary 1. Assuming eqn. (4) holds, the di¤erence in the optimal reporting precision in the bad state and the good state for …rm j typically increases as either: 1) B decreases; 2) G increases; or 3) G increases and B decreases simultaneously.
The intuition that underlies Corollary 1 is that a decrease (increase) in the …rm's expected economic income in the bad (good) state increases (decreases) the net marginal bene…t from an increase in j in the bad (good) state. Consequently, the entrepreneur chooses a higher (lower) level of j in the bad (good) state. This, in turn, increases the magnitude of the asymmetry in the extent to which reported earnings re ‡ect economic income in the two
states.
An implication of Corollary 1 is that it is not necessary to bifurcate the analysis into just two states: good and bad. Corollary 1 implies that one could posit a continuum of states ranging from very bad to very good as a consequence of E hṼ j i , and, provided that the inequality in eqn. (4) holds, the entrepreneur's choice of reporting precision will decrease as …rm j's expected economic income, E hṼ j i , increases, ceteris paribus. We formally prove this intuition in the following corollary.
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Corollary 2. Assuming eqn. (4) holds, the entrepreneur's choice of reporting precision typically decreases as …rm j's expected economic income increases (ceteris paribus).
Asymmetric reporting and systematic risk
In the context of the results reported above, there are two points worth emphasizing, especially as it relates to future empirical work. First, regarding the endogenous determinants of systematic risk, recall from eqn. (3) Second, an important implication of our approach to endogenizing both reporting precision and systematic risk is that it links expected economic income and priced risk. Because the …rm's expected economic income determines reporting precision, and, in turn, reporting precision determines investors'assessment of the …rm's systematic risk, our analysis suggests that higher levels of expected economic income will be associated with higher levels of systematic risk. Although this observation follows directly from Observation 1 in conjunction with Corollary 2, we nonetheless codify it as follows.
Observation 2. Assuming eqn. (4) holds, conditional on observing earnings, investors' assessments of …rm j's systematic risk typically increases as the …rm's expected economic increases.
Importantly, prior literature on the role of asymmetric reporting in reducing agency costs and facilitating e¢ cient contracting suggests asymmetric reporting will manifest in the mean of the …rm's cash ‡ow. In contrast, in our model (premised exclusively on the valuation role of earnings) asymmetric reporting manifests in the …rm's covariance with the market portfolio. To the best of our knowledge this prediction is unique to our model. Thus, empirical researchers can use the above "observations"to distinguish among the various explanations for why reported earnings asymmetrically re ‡ect economic income. If the asymmetry is solely attributable to the stewardship role of earnings, then we would not expect Observations 1 and 2 to manifest in the data.
Welfare Analysis
As a …nal comparative static, we discuss welfare implications of an exogenous change in the minimum level of reporting precision required by the regulator, ? . One can think of an exogenous change in the minimum level of reporting precision required by the regulator as a the adoption of new accounting standards that alter the extent to which reported earnings re ‡ect economic income without regard to the state. For example, in the absence of manipulation and illiquidity, the application of fair value accounting (to the entire balance sheet), should result in reported earnings that symmetrically re ‡ect economic income. Of course, any welfare analysis regarding regulatory action has to carefully distinguish between the welfare of the entrepreneur, as a representation of the current ownership of …rm j, and the welfare of investors.
First, consider the circumstance where the minimum level of reporting precision required by the regulator increases. From the perspective of the entrepreneur, an increase in ?
is welfare debilitating. When the inequality in eqn. (4) does not hold, the entrepreneur will choose the lowest level of reporting precision allowed by the regulator, ? . In this circumstance, increasing ? is bad for the entrepreneur because it requires that he incur greater costs than he would otherwise prefer (i.e., recall that the cost to the entrepreneur of complying with the regulatory lower bound is 1 2 2 ? ). When the inequality in eqn. (4) holds, there exists a unique optimal reporting precision where the net marginal bene…ts equal the cost of e¤ort. To the extent that the new higher level of ? exceeds this optimal level, however, the entrepreneur is forced to choose ? . In this circumstance, increasing
? is also bad for the entrepreneur: the lowest level of reporting precision allowed by the regulator exceeds the optimal level of reporting precision, such that the costs associated with ? exceed the net marginal bene…ts. In short, an increase in the minimum level of reporting precision required by the regulator cannot make the entrepreneur better o¤, and may make him worse o¤.
Now consider the welfare of investors. In the context of the CAPM, the term "investors"
is really a reference to potential investors: individuals who have no current ownership stake in the …rm, but nonetheless compete against other individuals (who also have no ownership stake) to purchase the …rm's shares. In other words, in the CAPM (and in our model) prices are set based on competition among individuals who have no ownership stakes. The net payo¤ to each investor in …rm j is simply the (realized) liquidating dividend less the (realized) share price, V j P j . Thus, investors would prefer to pay as little as possible to purchase shares. In our model, more precise reporting increases price by reducing systematic risk. Although this works in favor of the entrepreneur (as a representation of the current ownership of the …rm), it works against potential investors who are competing for shares of the …rm. 6 Thus, to the extent an increase in ? forces the entrepreneur to increase reporting precision, investors are made worse o¤. In short, as was the case for the entrepreneur, an increase in the minimum level of reporting precision required by the regulator cannot make investors better o¤, and may make them worse o¤. Taken together, this implies that an increase in the minimum level of reporting precision can not make anyone better o¤, and potentially makes everyone in the economy worse o¤.
Next, consider the circumstance where the minimum level of reporting precision required by the regulator decreases. The same logic and intuition applies, but in the opposite direction. A decrease in ? relaxes the regulatory constraint on the entrepreneur. If the optimal level of reporting precision was previously above ? , and thus the regulatory constrain was not binding, then decreasing ? and relaxing the constraint has no e¤ect. If the optimal level of reporting precision was previously below ? , and thus the regulatory constraint was binding, then decreasing ? and relaxing the constraint makes everyone better o¤. Thus, a decrease in the minimum level of reporting precision can not make anyone worse o¤, and potentially makes everyone in the economy better o¤. We codify the discussion above as a corollary (where the discussion serves as the proof).
Corollary 3. An increase in the minimum level of reporting precision required by the regulator, ? , never increases welfare and potentially makes everyone in the economy worse o¤. A decrease in the minimum level of reporting precision required by the regulator never decreases welfare and potentially makes everyone in the economy better o¤.
In Corollary 3, it is important to emphasize the role played by the assumption that more precise reporting entails an explicit cost. In the absence of an explicit cost, the entrepreneur 6 To elaborate on this point, if investors could hold the price of …rm j …xed, they would prefer more precise reporting because this serves to reduce systematic risk and investors are risk averse. The problem is that investors cannot collude to hold prices …xed when reporting precision increases: competition among them bids-up the price of …rm j when reporting precision increases. From a utility (or welfare) perspective, the net e¤ect of an increase in price and a reduction in systematic risk leaves investors worse o¤.
would move would move to the "corner solution" of the highest level of reporting precision achievable when the inequality in eqn. (4) holds. Thus, the only reason why an increase in the minimum level of reporting precision required by the regulator is welfare debilitating for the entrepreneur is because increased reporting precision entails an explicit cost. In this regard, the cost of capital is not synonymous with welfare. While an increase in the minimum level of reporting precision required by the regulator may reduce systematic risk (and hence reduce the cost of capital), because reporting is costly, this reduction may not be welfare enhancing.
Conclusion
One of the most studied-and controversial-properties of …nancial reporting is the asymmetry in the extent to which reported earnings re ‡ect contemporaneous economic income.
Existing economic theory suggests that the asymmetry in reported earnings is exclusively the result of the stewardship role of earnings: the role of earnings in mitigating agency problems and facilitating e¢ cient contracting. In this paper, we examine whether there are additional economic forces beyond the stewardship role of earnings that could give rise to the asymmetry in reported earnings, and, in turn, whether this asymmetry is valuable even in the absence of agency con ‡icts.
We develop a parsimonious model to study the endogenous choice of reporting system and whether that system entails asymmetric treatment of economic income. We extend the classic Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to a setting where a regulator requires that …rms report earnings prior to selling shares to investors but does not specify the reporting system that maps economic income into reported earnings. Instead, a risk-averse entrepreneur (as representative of the …rms'initial owners) endogenously chooses the extent to which reported earnings re ‡ect economic income as a function of expect economic income (i.e., the "state").
In modeling the reporting system we deliberately abstract away from agency con ‡icts and contracting considerations. This ensures that our results are solely attributable to the valuation role of earnings. Nevertheless, and despite the absence of agency problems and contracts, we show that under very mild conditions an entrepreneur will endogenously choose a reporting system that entails asymmetric treatment of economic income: a reporting system where reported earnings re ‡ect economic income to a greater extent in the bad state (as compared to the good state).
In addition, we show that the choice of reporting system endogenously a¤ects investors' assessments of …rms'systematic risk. Speci…cally, we show that when the optimal reporting system entails asymmetric treatment of economic income, the …rm's systematic risk is also asymmetric. Firms where reported earnings re ‡ect economic income to a greater extent in bad states have lower (higher) covariance with the market portfolio in bad (good) states.
Our model and the accompanying results provide a number of novel insights for empirical research. First, we demonstrate that asymmetry in reported earnings can exist under even in the absence of agency and contracting considerations. Thus, our analysis illustrates that although agency con ‡icts and contracting considerations are undoubtedly important economic forces that shape …nancial reporting, they need not be the only forces. The valuation role of earnings alone, can result in an earnings number that asymmetrically re ‡ects economic income. As a consequence, our model predicts asymmetry in reported earnings even in …rms without debt (i.e. no debt contracts) and where agency problems are minimal.
Second, prior literature on the role of asymmetric reporting in reducing agency con‡icts suggests asymmetric reporting a¤ects the mean of the …rm's cash ‡ow; as such, it has exclusively an indirect e¤ect on the …rm's cost of capital. In our analysis, asymmetric reporting has an additional direct e¤ect that operates through investors'assessment of the …rm's covariance with the market portfolio. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the …rst model to predict that asymmetric reporting has an endogenous e¤ect on systematic risk and …rms'cost of capital. Empirical researchers that examine the capital market consequences of …nancial reporting can test whether asymmetric reporting manifests in …rms' betas in the spirit of a Conditional CAPM, and potentially use this prediction to distinguish among the various explanations for the asymmetry in reported earnings. For example, if the asymmetry is solely attributable to the stewardship role of earnings, then we would not observe asymmetry in systematic risk.
Another important implication of our model stems from the intuition that underlies our results. The key tension in our model relates to risk-averse entrepreneurs balancing the explicit cost of providing an earnings number that more precisely re ‡ects economic income against the bene…t of a reduction in systematic risk. Explicitly articulating this tradeo¤ highlights that a regulatory increase in the minimum level of required reporting precision may in fact, be welfare debilitating. While an increase in the minimum level of reporting precision may reduce systematic risk and the cost of capital, because reporting is costly, this reduction may not be welfare enhancing either for the …rm's current or future owners. In this regard, our results emphasize that the cost of capital is not synonymous with welfare. Consider an economy with J …rms, indexed by the subscript j = 1; 2; :::; J, and a risk-free bond. We assume that the risk-free rate of return is R f ; that is, an investment of $1 in the risk-free bond yields a return of $1 + R f . LetṼ j and P j represent the uncertain cash ‡ows of …rm j and the market equilibrium price of …rm j, respectively. Along with the J …rms, we introduce a perfectly competitive market for …rm shares comprised of N investors, …rm; and let P = fP 1 ; P 2 ; :::; P j ; :::; P J g represent the vector of …rm prices, where once again P j represents the price of …rm j. Let B i and B i represent investor i's demand for a risk-free bond and her endowment in bonds, respectively. Each investor solves
subject to the budget constraint
Taking the expectation of eqn. (A1) and substituting in the relation
where is an J J covariance matrix whose s; t-th term is Cov
The …rst-order condition that maximizes eqn. (A2) with respect to D ij reduces to
Because collectively investors have claims to the cash ‡ows of the entire …rm, for each k it must be the case that P N i=1 D ik = 1. Thus, summing over both sides of eqn. (A3) with respect to i yields
This, in turn, implies that the price for …rm j is given by
Q.E.D. 
Recall that the marginal cost that operates through . Thus, when eqn. (6) holds the entrepreneur chooses as his optimal
Eqn. (7) does not provide a closed-form expression for Thus, an increase in G implies a decrease in 
